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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
SCOTT PLUMMER,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________________)

NO. 45513
CUSTER COUNTY NO. CR 2017-8

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Scott Plummer pled guilty to statutory rape and the district court sentenced him to
twenty-one years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. When Mr. Plummer became
emotionally unstable due to his worsening mental health conditions, he was terminated from the
Department of Correction’s rider program. The district court denied Mr. Plummer’s subsequent
motion for Rule 35 relief.
On appeal, Mr. Plummer challenges the district court’s denial of his request for probation
rather than prison, and its denial of his request for a reduction of sentence. He argues that in
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light facts of his case, and the court’s failure to consider his mental health conditions, the district
court’s sentencing decisions represent an abuse its discretion.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Custer County Sheriff’s Office received a report that Mr. Plummer, age twenty, had
had sex with a fourteen-year old girl.1 (PSI, p.3.)2 Mr. Plummer was arrested and charged with
rape. (R., pp.10.) Mr. Plummer had no significant prior criminal record; he did, however, have
mental health issues, including diagnoses of bipolar disorder and severe depression, along with a
history of suicide attempts. (PSI, pp.8, 10, 127.)
Pursuant to an agreement with the State, and after three months in jail, Mr. Plummer pled
guilty to statutory rape. (R., pp.51, 111; Tr., p.22, Ls.17-23; p.58, Ls.12-123.) The State agreed
that pending sentencing, Mr. Plummer should be released back home to live with his paternal
grandmother, Kathleen Plummer, who had been his primary family support for years. (Tr., p.27,
L.10 – p.28, L.7.) The conditions of release included that Mr. Plummer obey all house rules,
make all of his doctor appointments, and follow all of his doctor’s recommendations. (Tr., p.27,
L.10 – p.28, L.7.) Even the victim’s step-father, who was in courtroom that day, agreed
Mr. Plummer should have that chance, with the “hope that he does good” and “proves himself.”
(Tr., p.35, Ls.4-16.)
As expected, Mr. Plummer complied fully with all of the conditions during his fiftyseven days of release. (Tr., p.72, Ls.9-11.) His medications were finally adjusted in a way that
addressed his mental health issues (Tr., p.58, Ls.14-24); and he had begun productive mental
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The age initially reported – thirteen – was incorrect; the State corrected the error at sentencing.
(Tr., p.74, Ls.6-19.)
2
Citations to the Presentence Investigation Report and attached confidential materials, including
the Addendum to the PSI, will use the designation “PSI” and will include the page numbers
associated with the 270-page electronic file containing those documents.
2

health therapy, improving his mental health dramatically (Tr., p.63, Ls.2-5). Thus, by the time of
sentencing, Mr. Plummer had become emotionally stable, hopeful in his future, and ready to
participate in offender treatment. (Tr., p.58, Ls.14-24.)
During his release, Mr. Plummer also underwent the court-ordered psychosexual
evaluation (PSE), conducted by Dr. Gayle Snowden, Ph.D., a highly qualified, state certified,
Senior Evaluator. (PSI, pp.108-270.) The evaluation encompassed Mr. Plummer’s personal,
and family histories, and criminal history; information derived from interviews conducted by
licensed professionals; and a battery of psychometric testing administered – including
adjustments for deception. (PSI, pp.111-65.) Dr. Snowden issued a PSE Report that concluded
(1) that Mr. Plummer presented an average risk of reoffending; (2) that he was not violent; (3)
that he was amenable to treatment and capable of putting forth the requisite effort, and that he
would do well in community-based sex-offender treatment. (PSI, pp.111, 135, 165.)
Significantly, Dr. Snowden also reported that, while Mr. Plummer was not currently
suffering symptoms of depression, he presented a high suicide risk due to his past victimization
and his bipolar disorder, and cautioned: “Mr. Plummer will not do well at an Idaho Department
of Correction prison environment due to immaturity and lack of coping skills.” (PSI, pp.158,
163.) Dr. Snowden’s recommendations encouraged placing Mr. Plummer on probation with
court-ordered community-based sex-offender treatment in a program that provides strong mental
health support. (PSI, p.163.)
The GAIN assessment likewise acknowledged Mr. Plummer’s serious mental health
issues and his need for mental health treatment and recommended that Mr. Plummer be placed in
out-patient treatment. (PSI, pp.10, 43.) In a letter to the court that was read at sentencing,
Kathleen Plummer also informed the court of Mr. Plummer’s mental health struggles and that at
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long last, he was getting the help he needed with his new therapist and new mix of medication;
she expressed concern that Mr. Plummer’s mental health would deteriorate, and that he would
not do well, if he were placed in confinement again. (Tr., p.47, Ls.19-24.) The presentence
investigator recommended incarceration, albeit with a rider, citing her belief that Dr. Snowden
had been manipulated by Mr. Plummer.3 (PSI, p.28.)
At sentencing, citing Mr. Plummer’s success on release, his amenability to and
recommendations for treatment in the community, and the need for continued mental health
support, counsel for Mr. Plummer asked the court to place Mr. Plummer on probation, with an
underlying suspended five-year sentence, with two years fixed. (Tr., p.60, Ls.4-10.) The State
opposed probation, and siding with the presentence investigator, recommended that
Mr. Plummer be required to serve out a “rider” with the Department of Correction. (Tr., p.51,
Ls.20 – p.-24.) Alternatively, if the court were to order “straight prison” for this offense, the
State’s recommendation was that the fixed portion of the sentence be just two years, but with a
long, 18-year “tail.” (Tr., p.51, L.1 – p.52, L.13.)
The district court declined to place Mr. Plummer on probation; without any mention or
apparent consideration of Mr. Plummer’s mental health issues, the district court imposed a
sentence of twenty-one years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.77, Ls.920.) The court stated, simply, “the reason why the retained jurisdiction is attractive to me is
because I can forego making the ultimate conclusion today of placing you in the community until
I know a little bit more.” (Tr., p.76, Ls.13-16.)
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The PSI writer cited the fact that Mr. Snowden had made certain disclosures to Dr. Snowden,
and to the GAIN evaluator, but not to her. (PSI, p.28.)
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Unfortunately, but as predicted, Mr. Plummer’s mental health deteriorated dramatically
once he was placed into IDOC custody. (PSI, pp.260-65; R., p.144; Aug.Tr., p.7, Ls.4-25.) He
became withdrawn, uncommunicative, unstable and despondent; he talked about suicide. (PSI,
pp.260-65.) His programming did not go well, and within weeks of his arrival he was terminated
from the program for planning his escape. (PSI, pp.260-65; R., p.144.) Mr. Plummer’s case
manager stated, “I do believe that [Mr. Plummer] can benefit from programming and is
intelligent enough to be successful in a ‘Rider’ situation. The problem seems to be that he needs
time to stabilize his emotional state before beginning.” (PSI, p.265.) The APSI noted that
Mr. Plummer’s “mental health has been a major barrier to completing the [rider] program.” (PSI,
p.265.) After receiving the APSI, the district court entered an order relinquishing jurisdiction.
(R., pp.144, 145.)
Counsel for Mr. Plummer filed a motion pursuant to Rule 35 seeking prompt placement
in the community so that Mr. Plummer could be treated for his increasingly-critical mental health
issues. (R., p.156.) Counsel described the productive relationship that Mr. Plummer developed
with Dr. Snowden prior to incarceration, and that the prospect of continued treatment with
Dr. Snowden had given Mr. Plummer hope. (Aug.Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.8, L.11.) Counsel implored
the court to allow Mr. Plummer to seek help with the one provider, Dr. Snowden, who was able
to reach him and give him hope. (Aug.Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.8, L.11; p.10, Ls.6-8.) The district court
denied that request, expressing its “surprise” and “disappointment” with Mr. Plummer’s rider
failure. (Aug.Tr., p.27, Ls.1-19.)
However, the court invited counsel to provide supplemental information in aid of a
decision whether to reduce the fixed portion of Mr. Plummer’s sentence, which would allow him
earlier access to treatment and programming within IDOC, and thus potentially provide an earlier
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release from custody. (Aug.Tr., p.27, Ls.19-24.) In response to that invitation, counsel submitted
affidavits confirming that Dr. Snowden would treat Mr. Plummer upon release and informing the
court on the availability of appropriate housing in the community. (Aug.R., pp.2, 5.) Upon
receipt of the information, the district court promptly denied Mr. Plummer’s motion.
(Aug.R., pp.4, 16.) Mr. Plummer filed a notice of appeal that is timely from the judgment of
conviction, the order relinquishing jurisdiction, and the denial of his Rule 35 motion. See I.A.R.
14(a). (R., p.146.)

ISSUE

In light of Mr. Plummer’s serious mental health issues, did the district court abuse its discretion
by declining to grant probation, and by denying his motion for a reduction of his sentence?

ARGUMENT
In Light Of Mr. Plummer’s Serious Mental Health Issues, The District Court Abused Its
Discretion By Declining To Place Him On Probation, And Declining To Grant His Motion For A
Reduction Of Sentence
The district court abused its discretion when, in in light of Mr. Plummer’s serious mental
health issues, the court declined to place him on probation or to reduce his sentence.
The appellate court reviews the district court’s sentencing decisions for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 826, 834 (2011). The relevant, three-tiered inquiry is: (1)
whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. A
sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting
society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.
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State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 836 (2000). A sentence is unreasonable, representing an
abuse of discretion, if the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. State v.
Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982). When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence the appellate
court conducts an independent examination of the record, “having regard to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.” State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982).
In determination whether to place a defendant on probation or instead to send him to
prison, Idaho Code § 19-2521 requires that the district court not impose a prison sentence
“unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character
and condition of the defendant, it is of the opinion that imprisonment is appropriate for
protection of the public…” I.C. § 19-2521 (emphasis added).
In addition to the considerations above, where a defendant’s mental condition is a
significant issue, “Idaho Code Section 19-2523 requires that the sentencing judge also weigh that
mental condition as a sentencing consideration.” Miller, 151 Idaho at 834. Specifically, Idaho
Code § 19–2523 requires the trial court to look at several factors:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at large,
or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the offense
charged.
I.C. § 19–2523(1)(a)–(f).
Although a defendant’s mental health is only one of the factors that must be considered
and weighed by the court at sentencing, the record must show the court adequately considered
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the substance of the factors when it imposed the sentence. Miller, 151 828, 836 (2011); State v.
Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 461 (2002).
A.

The District Court Failed To Adequately Consider Mr. Plummer’s Mental Health
Condition, As Required By Statute
The record in this case fails to show that the district court adequately considered

Mr. Plummer’s mental health when it made its sentencing decisions. At the initial sentencing
hearing, the district court cited the sentencing factors it recognized it was obliged to consider and
engaged in a lengthy discussion of those factors; entirely absent from this discussion, however, is
any reference to its duty under I.C. § 19–2523(1) to consider Mr. Plummer’s mental health
condition.

(See Tr., p.65, L.6 – p.83, L.4.)

Although the court ordered a psychosexual

evaluation (PSE), it did not acknowledge Mr. Plummer’s significant mental health issues and
need for treatment, nor his concerns regarding Mr. Plummer’s heightened risk of suicide; nor did
the court attempt to address the PSE’s conclusion that Mr. Plummer would not do well in a
Department of Correction setting. (See generally Tr., p.65, L.6 – p.83, L.4.) Given the abundant
information presented to the district court, including Mr. Plummer’s compliance with all
conditions while on pretrial release, its decision to “prolong” community treatment, and to place
Mr. Plummer in a prison setting instead, was unreasonable, representing an abuse of discretion.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Reduce Mr. Plummer’s
Excessive Sentence
The district court additionally abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Plummer’s

requests, made pursuant to Rule 35, to place him on probation or else to reduce his sentence;
specifically, the fixed portion of his sentence, from three years to two. Mr. Plummer’s mental
health had drastically deteriorated since he was placed in the custody of the Department of
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Correction, and his need for adequate mental health treatment, and the availability of that
treatment in the community, was clear. (PSI, pp.144, 145; Aug.Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.8, L.11.)
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted if
the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App.
1994). In reviewing the grant or denial of a Rule 35 motion, the appellate court must “consider
the entire record and apply the same criteria used for determining the reasonableness of the
original sentence.” State v. Carter, 157 Idaho 900, 903 (Ct. App. 2014). In presenting a Rule 35
motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional
information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion.

State v.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007).
Mr. Plummer’s sentence of twenty-one years, with three years fixed, is excessive in light
of the mitigating facts of this case and the additional information provided in conjunction with
Mr. Plummer’s Rule 35 motion. Mr. Plummer has no significant prior criminal history – just
two misdemeanors for bad driving. (PSI, p.4.) When he committed this offense he was young,
just twenty, and emotionally immature for his age. (PSI, p.139.) He came from an unstable
home and grew up feeling unloved, and had low self-esteem. (PSI, pp.6, 110.) His biological
mother gave up her parental rights when he was just three. (PSI, p.6.) His step-mother adopted
him, but he had a rough relationship with his father, and Mr. Plummer went to live with his
grandmother when he was thirteen. (PSI, pp.5-6.)
However, Mr. Plummer is bright and articulate, and is not afraid of doing hard work; he
had to work harder than most at school, but he persevered and graduated, making his family
proud. (PSI, p.7.) Notwithstanding his current difficulties, he plans to go on to college and
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obtain his doctorate. (PSI, p.7.) While he was in school he worked part time at filling station,
then became certified learned to operate various heavy equipment. (PSI, p.7.) He has the ability
to work hard and obtain the skills that he needs.
Mr. Plummer also took accountability and showed remorse for his actions, which are
factors considered in determining that his sentence was excessive. He admitted what he had
done was very wrong, not only by pleading guilty, but by expressing remorse to his evaluators
and to the victim’s family. (See PSI, pp.13, 112.) At sentencing, he directly addressed the
victim’s family members in the courtroom, telling them he was sorry for the pain he had put
them all though. (Tr., p.62, Ls.2-21.)
As discussed above, Mr. Plummer’s serious mental health conditions are factors that must
be taken into account at sentencing. Miller, at 826. In high school, Mr. Plummer was diagnosed
with bipolar disorder, severe depression, suicidal ideation, and had been hospitalized for his
mental health. (PSI, pp.7, 119.) He struggled for years to find an effective therapist and the
right balance of medications to address his mental health needs. (Tr., p.58, Ls.14-24). Once his
medications were properly adjusted and he was receiving treatment from a trusted therapist, as
was the case in the months before sentencing, Mr. Plummer demonstrated that he was capable of
showing empathy, engaging in treatment, and showing hope for his future. (Tr., p.63, Ls.2-5).
At the Rule 35 hearing, trial counsel detailed the deterioration of Mr. Plummer’s mental
health since his placement with the Department of Correction. (Aug.Tr., p.7, Ls.4-25.) Counsel
provided the court with confirmation that Dr. Snowden would treat him in the community, and
information regarding availability of sex offender housing in the community, once Mr. Plummer
was released. (Aug.Tr., p.6, L.9 – p.8, L.11.) Counsel provided every reason for the court to
place Mr. Plummer on supervised probation, or to at least reduce his fixed sentence to allow the
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opportunity for Mr. Plummer’s early release. Given all of this information, the district court’s
denial of Mr. Plummer’s request for relief was unreasonable, representing an abuse of its
sentencing discretion. The district court’s decisions should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Plummer respectfully requests that this Court vacate his sentence and remand his
case to the district court with instructions that he be placed on probation, or else that his sentence
be reduced.
Dated this 17th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17th day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct
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Mail, addressed to:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
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